17. Id.; id. to 125 (Farrell) (with the indication that a non-assertion clause is essentially „unlicensed permitted to use the other`s intellectual property“). According to the roundtable participants, implementation agreements can generate efficiencies if they promote the dissemination of an upstream research instrument, for example by creating the opportunity to assess the research instrument or create an appropriate fee. (62) Some have indicated that the initial fee for the use of a patented research instrument may be difficult to determine if there is no „commercial product,“ and „the owner of the research tool and tool users may have very different views on the proper economic assessment of the instrument.“ (63) Participants stated that the parties were in a better position to assess the value of the research instrument by giving the patent holder of the research instrument the opportunity to create royalties for the sale of downstream discoveries instead of prior licences, taking into account the value of the product developed with the research instrument. (64) Reach through licensing agreements also allow the owner and researchers to track the research instrument to share the risks of innovation, with the owner of the game-playing research tool leading to the development of a commercially viable product. (65) In this way, scope licences can facilitate an effective allocation of risks in the event of uncertainty about the value of the technology granted. 64. See 6 November tr. under 154-56 (Burtis) („[P]eople, car . . [they are] a way to rent effectively . .
. »); February 26 Tr. to 279 (Blackburn) („I think it really is a price negotiation, how much the owner of the tool benefits from the successful development of a product. In order for the risk allocation to be, in my view, taken into account in the pricing. see also Nielsen, 32 Fed. L. Rev. at 176 („If an upstream invention were later designated as a basic research instrument, the early fixing of a value would deprive the patent holder of valuable revenues and allow the taker to draw wind. The rights of way allow the patent holder to defer decisions on the value of research instruments and technologies.“ For more than a decade, agencies have relied on guidelines on agreements and abuses of dominant IP licensing positions („ip antitrust guidelines“) to assist in the analysis of complex licensing practices. (1) Recognizing that intellectual property rights („IP“) are essential to the proper functioning of a market economy, the agencies have highlighted a number of fundamental principles regarding the overlapping of IP law and rules and policies regarding cartels and abuse of dominance in THE IP guidelines on cartels and abuses of dominance. Among these principles is the recognition that an IP right does not necessarily create market power; (2) Intellectual property agreements can be analysed on the basis of the same rules on cartels and abuse of dominance applicable to agreements on other real estate(3) and (3) IP licensing is generally pro-competitive.
(4) The vast majority of authorisation restrictions can be expected to „contribute to a more efficient integration of economic activity,“ for example by „facilitating the combination of the licensee`s intellectual property with [other] complementary factors of production.“ (5) The agencies will therefore evaluate these agreements in accordance with the explanatory statement. (6) 52.